In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.
Introduction
The major goal of the present paper is to construct a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form game situations, especially, those games consist of two groups of populations. The existence and uniqueness of the new game equilibrium induced by stochastic group evolution and rational individual choice have been proved, and also the stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time (i.e., in the sense of stochastic stopping time) and space (i.e., from the viewpoint of invariant probability measure) dimensions, which is different from the classical approach of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . Furthermore, Theorem 1 in section 2 not only provides us with the explicit form of the new game equilibrium but also provides us with the explicit time length needed so that the game equilibrium can be achieved by decentralized players. And this would be regarded as an important characteristic of the new game equilibrium relative to traditional approach (see, Samuelson and Zhang, 1992; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Matsui and Matsuyama, 1995; Foster and Young, 2003; Binmore et al., 2003) .
Noting that both evolutionary game theory and rational choice theory have very important economic implications, the current paper introduces a new game equilibrium by combining both of the above, i.e., evolutionary game theory (see, Friedman, 1991; Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Benaïm and Weibull, 2003 , and among others) corresponds to group-level deterministic or stochastic evolution via both the well-known random-matching rule (e.g., Ellison, 1994; Zhou, 1999; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004; Duffie and Sun, 2007; Aliprantis et al., 2007 , and among others) and deterministic or stochastic replicator dynamics (e.g., Foster and Young, 1990; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Binmore et al., 1995; Cabrales, 2000; Corradi and Sarin, 2000; Imhof, 2005; Benaïm et al., 2008 , and among others) while rational choice theory (see, Harsanyi, 1966; Bernheim, 1984; Aumann, 1987 , and among others) corresponds to individual-level and decentralized rational decision. Most importantly, the present paper successfully shows that optimal stopping theory that has been widely applied in mathematical finance (see, Myneni, 1992; Shepp and Shiryaev, 1993; Hobson, 1998; Guo and Shepp, 2001; Avram et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2004; Alili and Kyprianou, 2005 ) plays a crucial role in characterizing and finally demonstrating the existence and uniqueness of the new game equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model where the formal definition of the new game equilibrium is given and the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium are proved; section 3 demonstrates the stability of the game equilibrium from both time and space dimensions; section 4 concludes and the Appendix provides the main mathematical derivations. ( ) Fudenberg et al., 2004; Imhof and Nowak, 2006 , and among others) have confirmed that Assumption 1 has very important implications. That is to say, on the one hand, Assumption 1 is used to make things much easier from the viewpoint of pure mathematics; and also, Assumption 1 is indeed without loss of any generality in the sense of economic and biological intuitions on the other hand.
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And simultaneously,
..., I ) can be regarded as objective parameters that measure the intensity of evolutionary selection (see, Ohtsuki et al., 2007) , and also, this specification reflects the idea that, in reality, REMARK 2.4: Here, and throughout the current paper, we study the game equilibrium by employing evolutionary game theory under uncertainty, which implies that the game equilibrium is characterized from the viewpoint of group level, thereby leading to a case where classical optimal control theory is not suitable for rational individual choice while stochastic optimal stopping theory is powerful and hence plays a crucial role in proving and characterizing the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is specifically worth emphasizing that the game equilibrium is achieved through decentralized rational individual choice of many players in the corresponding game although the game equilibrium is characterized in the sense of group level based upon the classical evolutionary game theory.
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Similarly, notice that 
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 . And inspection of the fitness functions given in (3) reveals that one can just
And hence the corresponding characteristic operators of ( ) Z t  and ( ) Z t are respectively given by,
Therefore, based upon the above assumptions and specifications, the following theorem is derived, PROOF: See Appendix A. ▌ REMARK 2.5: It is especially worth noting that Theorem 1 not only shows the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium given by Definition 1 but also provides us with the explicit time length needed so that the game equilibrium can be achieved by decentralized players. And hence this would be regarded as one major characteristic of the corresponding game equilibrium relative to the traditional approach and hence Nash equilibrium concept (see, Nash, 1950 Nash, , 1951 .
Stability of the Game Equilibrium
By solving Problem 1 defined in the previous section, we get the optimal stopping times as follows, REMARK 3.1: It is especially worth noting that we employ Assumption 4 is just for the sake of simplicity. Indeed, the existence and uniqueness of the probability measure can be ensured under certain weak conditions (see, Garay and Hofbauer, 2003) , and one can also refer to Theorem 2.1 of Imhof (2005) and Theorem 3.1 of Benaïm et al (2008) for much more details. 
for  p   and 2 p  . 
where, 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games. The basic economic intuition behind the approach is very simple, i.e., classical evolutionary game theory emphasizes the deterministic or stochastic evolution of the populations as a group or many groups while rational individual choice theory also has very important economic implications, that is, the present paper chooses the way that reasonably combines both group-level stochastic evolution and individual-level rational choice. By noting that optimal control theory (i.e., dynamic optimization theory) is not suitable for the present case, we do so by introducing optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. And hence the existence and uniqueness of the new game equilibrium have been demonstrated. Moreover, the stability of the new game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.
Noting that our approach provides us with a general framework, the corresponding applications will be very rich, e.g., inducing cooperative equilibrium in PD games and Pareto optimal equilibrium in coordination games. Finally, our approach can be easily extended to include multiple priors (see , Riedel, 2009, for instance) and also study evolutionary dynamics and corresponding equilibria in complex networks (see, Pacheco et al., 2006 , for example) and on graphs (see, Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2007; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2008 , and among others).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1. 
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